The Explicit Animal: A Defence of Human Consciousness

The Explicit Animal: A Defence of Human Consciousness

by Raymond Tallis
Published by St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1999
297 pages, $19

reviewed by
Dan Simon
Innovatia Software
dansimon@innovatia.com

Raymond Tallis is a Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester. He has written about 150 medical publications. His writing outside of the medical field includes short stories, poetry, reflections on art and science, and philosophy. The reason that this book is titled “The Explicit Animal” is that Tallis believes that explicitness is the core of what it means to be human. By explicitness he means consciousness; that is, humans are explicitly aware of their own selves and make explicit free-well decisions. In this book, addressed to all those who are interested in the philosophy of mind, Tallis vigorously defends attempts to minimize the incomprehensibility of human consciousness. In particular, he attacks the ideas that (1) consciousness can be explained in biological terms; (2) consciousness can be explained in computational terms; and (3) consciousness can be explained in functional terms. The book consists primarily in his objections to the philosophies of others rather than positive statements of his own views.

In the first chapter Tallis presents a summary of modern attempts to minimize or eliminate the existence of human consciousness. The full depth of human consciousness is an embarrassment to those who hold a naturalistic world view because it simply cannot (yet) be explained in purely naturalistic terms.

In chapter two he attacks the biological explanation of consciousness by asserting that consciousness does not have any evolutionary survival value. An unconscious automaton would seem to function at least as well (or maybe better) than a conscious animal. Not only are there no “how” and “why” explanations for the evolution of consciousness, but Tallis presents several arguments that indicate that there is simply no possibility that consciousness could have evolved naturally.

In the third chapter Tallis attacks the Causal Theory of Perception, which states that consciousness simply consists of the exchange of information between the outside environment and an animal’s nervous system. This is an interesting and highly philosophical chapter that discusses such things as the definition of information, the possibility of objectively measuring sensation, and the relationship between perception and objective fact.

Chapter four attacks the attempt to computerize consciousness. There are those who argue that the mind-to-brain relationship is analogous to the computer software-to-hardware relationship. Tallis insists that consciousness will never be attained by a computer. Computers may be able to simulate consciousness but they will never possess consciousness. His points here are well-taken but they may be overstated due to his lack of expertise in the field of artificial intelligence.

The fifth chapter argues that consciousness cannot be reduced to a set of input-output relationships. That is, Tallis attacks the functional theory of consciousness, the theory that consciousness is an externally observable phenomena rather than an internal and subjective quality. There are those who believe that if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck. Tallis would not agree and spends this chapter asserting that the external manifestations of consciousness do not capture its essence.

Chapters six and seven characterize the nature of consciousness by exploring the qualitative differences between humans and animals. Tallis says that although animals are conscious, human consciousness is qualitatively different than animal consciousness. Some manifestations of human consciousness that are fundamentally different than corresponding animal qualities include rationality, economics, morality, religion, politics, history, technology, speech, and the spirit of exploration. Tallis asserts that it is clear that the human body has evolved from the bodies of non-human predecessors, but the existence of consciousness does not seem to fit into that paradigm.

The book concludes with 43 pages of notes and references (nearly as interesting as the text itself) that attest to the author’s high level of education on this problem of mind. I came away from the book a bit frustrated in that Tallis does not propose any positive explanation for the existence of consciousness. He defends himself in this by stating that, at times, “the truth may be unfruitful.” However, he goes on to say that it is necessary to show that existing theories do not work before we can see what the current tasks of philosophy should really be. Tallis has presented a formidable multi-pronged challenge to those who seek to explain consciousness in purely naturalistic terms.

Home Credentials Publications White Papers

Last Revised: March 13, 2001